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Abstract
We propose a framework to analyze convergence between regions, incorporating the public sector
and technological knowledge spillovers in the context of a Neoclassical Growth Model. Secondly, we
apply novel estimation methods pertaining to the spatial econometrics literature introducing a spatial
autoregressive panel data model based on instrumental variables estimation. Additionally, we intro-
duce marginal effects associated with changing explanatory variables. Our model makes it possible
to analyze, in terms of convergence, the results obtained in Spanish regions with the policies imple-
mented during the period 1980–2007. The results support the idea that investments in physical, private
and public capital, as well as in education have a positive effect on regional development and cohe-
sion. Therefore, we can conclude that it is possible to obtain better results for regional convergence
with higher rates of public investment. We also obtain interesting results that confirm the existence of
spillover effects in economic growth and public policies, identifying their magnitude and significance.
Key words: speed of convergence; growth models; public policies.
JEL Codes: E13; O41; H54
1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is the analysis of the impact of the public sector in economic growth and
cohesion. With this aim in mind, we evaluate the effect of public policies on cohesion based on a gener-
alized version of the Neoclassical Growth Model proposed by Mankiw et al. (1992) and, following Ertur
and Koch (2007) and Fischer (2011), include spatial interactions. The literature on economic growth has
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devoted considerable effort to the analysis of the determinants of economic growth and the speed of con-
vergence. An extensive and influential number of research papers demonstrate the existence of conditional
convergence; that is, the tendency of the most backward economies to systematically grow at a faster rate
than more developed economies, once the conditioning factors of this process are controlled for (Mankiw
et al., 1992; Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004).
In the context of European Union, and specifically for the case of Spanish regions, development and
cohesion policies have received a great attention due to the fact that, according to European Commission,
they have positively contributed to regional growth and convergence.1 However, public investment poli-
cies oriented to intensify infrastructure equipment and education have often been questioned arguing that
they mainly serve distributional purposes, but have little effect on fostering economic growth and con-
vergence.2 Numerous papers in this literature show that the speed of convergence varies across studies,
depending on the specification and controlling for investment rates in physical and human capital.3 Some
other studies have tried to consider this issue but using different alternative measures. This is the case of
Dowrick et al. (2003), Becker et al. (2005), Philipson and Soares (2001), among others. Dowrick et al.
(2003) proposed their own index based on consumption and life expectancy, Becker et al. (2005) analyzed
welfare inequality, while Philipson and Soares (2001) examined the properties associated to income.
Most recently, Pastor and Serrano (2012) focused on the inequality in permanent income in the con-
text of European integration, using an approach complementary to Serrano (2006) and Pastor and Serrano
(2008). At the same time, and following the convergence studies based on current per capita income,
several authors enriched this approach with a methodology that also includes spatial interactions in an
extended neoclassical model as determinant of convergence (Ertur and Koch, 2007; Fischer, 2011).4 Al-
though the standard model used in the literature does not take into account the public sector and fiscal
policies as determinants of economic growth and regional cohesion.
This paper seeks to make a contribution to this debate offering a useful proposal to value how the
convergence process might have resulted under alternative public policies which differ in the rate of
public investment. Particularly, in this study we pay attention to the effect on the speed of convergence of
an increase in the rate of investment in public and in human capital endowments, since development and
cohesion policies incorporate spatial interactions through knowledge spillovers in the production process.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in this study we introduce this contribution in three distinctive
ways. In the first place, we incorporate public sector and fiscal policies in the Mankiw et al. (1992)
extended neoclassical growth model with human capital, along with knowledge spillover, in line with the
recent literature that introduces spatial interactions to analyze the determinants of convergence. Secondly,
1See the different Cohesion Reports of the European Commission (1997, 2001, 2004, 2007). For a good survey of the
models used to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of EU cohesion policies, see Ederveen et al. (2003).
2For a criticism on structural policies in Europe see, for example, Boldrin and Canova (2001).
3See De la Fuente (2002) for an extended revision of the literature.
4LeGallo et al. (2003) and LeGallo and Dall’erba (2008) introduce spatial interactions in convergence between European
regions performing empirical contrasts based on spatial econometric techniques.
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following Álvarez et al. (2013) we implement programming routines in MATLAB5 that allow us to apply
novel estimations methods pertaining to the spatial econometrics literature (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998,
2010; Baltagi and Liu, 2011).6 Thirdly, using a novel dataset, an empirical contrast is performed with
Spanish regions during 1980-2007, a critical period in Spanish economic growth after joining the EU in
1986. Particularly, the weight matrix reflects proximity between NUTS-3 provinces based on contiguity.
Building on the proposed framework, the estimated convergence equation is based on spatial econo-
metric techniques developing a proposal in which estimations are repeated with different public policies.
Two types of scenarios are derived: the first scenario makes it possible to estimate the marginal contribu-
tions to income per worker growth resulting from increases in the rate of investment in each regressor; and
a second scenario where we estimate the speed of convergence in Spanish regions resulting from increases
in each one by dividing the sample by income per worker levels. These analyses allow us to provide some
public policies recommendations in order to improve economic convergence and regional cohesion.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the derivation of the growth model employed.
Section 3 presents the data and results. The last section draws the main conclusions.
2 The Model
2.1 The production function with knowledge spillovers
Each economy is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function for n regions along T periods with
constant returns to scale:
Yit = AitK
αK
it P
αP
it H
αH
it L
1−αK−αP−αH
it (1)
where Yit is the production of the i-th region in period t, Kit and Pit are the physical private and public
capital, respectively, Hit represents human capital, and Lit is the employment level. The parameter Ait
captures the level of technological knowledge. The production function is well-behaved satisfying the
desirable neoclassical properties or regularity conditions: i) the marginal productivities are positive and
decreasing; ii) it satisfies the Inada’s conditions; and iii) it shows decreasing scale performance in the
cumulative factors. We assume αK , αP and αH > 0, allowing us to analyze the behavior of this economy
in the steady state, as well as to empirically solve the corresponding convergence equation.
Equation (1) can be rewritten in per worker terms by dividing both sides by the employment Lit :
yit = Aitk
αK
it p
αP
it h
αH
it (2)
where yit , kit , pit and hit are production, physical private and public capital, and human capital per worker
respectively.
5These routines are available on http://www.paneldatatoolbox.com.
6Arbia et al. (2008) analyze the convergence in European regions on the basis of the neoclassical Solow model. These
authors consider variations on the basic specification of the convergence equation ranging from standard panel data models to
Bayesian models. The results obtained from different estimation strategies conclude that the evidence on regional convergence
depends to a larger extent on the econometric techniques.
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We define the technological knowledge as:
Ait =Ωtkθit p
φ
ith
γ
it
n
∏
j=1
kθρwi jjt p
φρwi j
jt h
γρwi j
jt (3)
It is worth noting several aspects of modeling the aggregate level of technology proposed as in (3), in
accordance with the specification introduced by Fischer (2011). Technology is expressed as a function of
a term Ωt , reflecting the exogenous common knowledge, physical and human capital of the own region,
but depends on the technological progress of other regions. The technological parameters, 0 < θ ,φ ,γ < 1
reflect the size of the home externalities, and the last term in (3) allows us to formalize the connectivity
between regions by mean of spatial weight terms, wi j. As for these spatial parameters of the model, we
assume that these terms are positive, the spatial-weight matrix is row-normalized ∑nj=1wi j = 1 ∀i =
1, . . . ,n, and wi j = 0 if i= j. The parameter ρ represents the regional technological interdependence, with
0 < ρ < 1.
The technological knowledge depends on the level of private, public and human capital of the own
region as well as its neighbor regions.
Inserting (3) into the production function per worker (2), we have:
yit =ΩtkαK+θit p
αP+φ
it h
αH+γ
it
n
∑
j=1
kθρwi jjt p
φρwit
jt h
γρwit
jt (4)
Equation (4) represents the output per worker incorporating the knowledge spillovers and allowing us
to relate the per worker output in region i to the capital investment in the same region and its neighbors.7
With respect to this specification it is worth highlight that changes in output can be due to variations in
the own capital stocks and in the stocks from the rest of the regions.
2.2 Dynamical transitions and steady state in Neoclassical Growth Model
The Neoclassical Growth Model assumes that labor in economy i grows at rate ni. On the other hand, it
is assumed that constant shares of income, sKi , s
P
i and s
H
i are invested in private, public and human capital
and those rates of investment are given exogenously, while these stocks depreciate at the same rate δ .8
We introduce the capital accumulation equations following Mankiw et al. (1992), in the case of human
capital, and Barro (1990) and Bajo-Rubio (2000) for disaggregating physical capital into private and
public. This induces the following dynamic equations for kit , pit and hit .
k˙it = sKi (1− τ)yit− (ni+δ )kit (5)
p˙it = sPi τyit− (ni+δ )pit (6)
h˙it = sHi τyit− (ni+δ )hit (7)
7If we set θ = φ = γ = 0 there would be no spillover effects and the per worker production function would be characterized
by yit =ΩkαKit p
αP
it h
αH
it , which represents a world with closed economies.
8The Solow model assumes exogenous savings, contrary to what happens in the expansion performed in the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model. This limitation does not prevent us from obtaining the steady state solution and deriving the convergence
equation allowed by their determinants.
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where τ is the size of the public sector, sKi , sPi and sHi are the fractions of income invested in private, public
and human capital, respectively.9 The dots above the capital variables denote derivatives with respect to
time.
In the steady state, private, public and human capital grow at a constant rate g:
k˙it
kit
= g
p˙it
pit
= g
h˙it
hit
= g (8)
Substituting the dynamic equations (5)–(7) into (8) and solving, we get the capital-output ratios:
k?it
y?it
=
sKi (1− τ)
ni+g+δ
(9)
p?it
y?it
=
sPi τ
ni+g+δ
(10)
h?it
y?it
=
sHi τ
ni+g+δ
(11)
with the star representing the steady state levels.
Inserting these expressions back into the production function per worker with the technological knowl-
edge (4) and solving for the output:
y?i =Ω
1
1−η
(
sKi (1− τ)
ni+g+δ
)αK+θ
1−η ( sPi τ
ni+g+δ
)αP+φ
1−η ( sHi τ
ni+g+δ
)αH+γ
1−η
n
∏
j=1
(
sKj (1− τ)
n j+g+δ
y?j
) θρwi j
1−η
(
sPj τ
n j+g+δ
y?j
) φρwi j
1−η
(
sHj τ
n j+g+δ
y?j
) γρwi j
1−η
(12)
with η = αK+αP+αH+θ +φ + γ .
We can group exponentials and get the following expression for output per worker in the steady state:
y?i =Ω
1
1−η
(
(sKi )
αK+θ (1− τ)αk+θ (sPi )αp+φ (sHi )αH+γ(τ)αp+αH+φ+γ
(ni+g+δ )η
) 1
1−η
n
∏
j=1
(
(sKj )
θ (1− τ)θ (sPj )φ (sHj )γ(τ)φ+γ
(n j+g+δ )θ+φ+γ
(y?j)
θ+φ+γ
) ρwi j
1−η
(13)
9The budget constrain of the public sector is given by τyit = cPi τyit + sPi τyit + sHi τyit , where cPi is the share of public
consumption, and cPi + s
P
i + s
H
i = 1.
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Taking logarithms we obtain the following expression:
lny?i =
1
1−η lnΩ+
αK+θ
1−η lns
K
i +
αP+φ
1−η lns
P
i +
αH+ γ
1−η lns
H
i
+
αK+θ
1−η ln(1− τ)+
αP+αH+φ + γ
1−η lnτ−
η
1−η ln(ni+g+δ )
+
θ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lnsKj +
φ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lnsPj +
γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lnsHj
+
θ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
ln(1− τ)+ φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
lnτ
−θ +φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j ln(n j+g+δ )
+
θ +φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lny?j
(14)
2.3 Conditional convergence
Our model predicts that income per worker converges to its steady state. To obtain the convergence
equation, we take differences in the logarithmic transformation of production function per worker:
d lnyit
dt
=(αK+θ)
d lnkit
dt
+(αP+φ)
d ln pit
dt
+(αH+ γ)
d lnhit
dt
+θρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
d lnk jt
dt
+φρ
n
∑
j=1
d ln p jt
dt
+ γρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
d lnh jt
dt
(15)
where d lnkitdt ,
d ln pit
dt ,
d lnhit
dt ,
d lnk jt
dt ,
d ln p jt
dt , and
d lnh jt
dt are the differences in the logarithmic transformations
of capital per worker.
Inserting (4) into the dynamic equations in (5)–(7) and dividing by the corresponding capital, we
obtain:
k˙it
kit
= sKi (1− τ)Ωtk−(1−αK−θ)it pαP+φit hαH+γit
n
∑
j=1
kθρwi jjt p
φρwit
jt h
γρwit
jt − (ni+δ ) (16)
p˙it
pit
= sPi τΩtk
αK+θ
it p
−(1−αP−φ)
it h
αH+γ
it
n
∑
j=1
kθρwi jjt p
φρwit
jt h
γρwit
jt − (ni+δ ) (17)
h˙it
hit
= sHi τΩtk
αK+θ
it p
αP+φ
it h
−(1−αH−γ)
it
n
∑
j=1
kθρwi jjt p
φρwit
jt h
γρwit
jt − (ni+δ ) (18)
The main result in our model is the existence of diminishing returns to the reproducible capital:
∂ (k˙it/kit)/∂kit < 0, ∂ (p˙it/pit)/∂ pit < 0 and ∂ (h˙it/hit)/∂hit < 0. When an economy increases its capital
per worker, the rate of growth decreases and converges to its own steady state. However, an increase in
capital per worker in a neighboring economy j increases the production in economy i if ∂ (k˙it/kit)/∂k jt > 0
6
, ∂ (p˙it/pit)/∂ p jt > 0 and ∂ (h˙it/hit)/∂h jt > 0, and positive technological interdependence is observed.
Therefore, the convergence result is still valid under the hypothesis
(αK+αP+αH)+
θ +φ + γ
1− (θρ+φρ+ γρ) < 1,
in contrast with endogenous growth models, where the marginal productivity in capital is constant.
As in the literature, the transitional dynamics can be quantified by using a log linearization of equations
(5)–(7) around the steady state (Appendix A):
d lnkit
dt
= g− (1−αK−θ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnkit− lnk?i ] (19)
d ln pit
dt
= g− (1−αP−φ)(ni+g+δ ) [ln pit− ln p?i ] (20)
d lnhit
dt
= g− (1−αH− γ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnhit− lnh?i ] (21)
Introducing (19)–(21) into equation (15), for i = 1, . . . ,n,and the corresponding to j, for i 6= j, we
obtain:
d lnyit
dt
=(αk+θ) [g− (1−αK−θ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnkit− lnk?i ]]
+(αP+φ) [g− (1−αP−φ)(ni+g+δ ) [ln pit− ln p?i ]]
+(αH+ γ) [g− (1−αH− γ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnhit− lnh?i ]]
+θρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αK−θ)(n j+g+δ )
[
lnk jt− lnk?j
]]
+φρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αP−φ)(n j+g+δ )
[
ln p jt− ln p?j
]]
+γρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αH− γ)(n j+g+δ )
[
lnh jt− lnh?j
]]
(22)
We consider the following relations between the gaps of economies with respect to their own steady
states, in order to reduce the difficulty of solving the convergence equation in (22):
lnkit− lnk?i = Θ j
[
lnk jt− lnk?j
]
(23)
ln pit− ln p?i = Φ j
[
ln p jt− ln p?j
]
(24)
lnhit− lnh?i = Γ j
[
lnh jt− lnh?j
]
(25)
lnyit− lny?i = Ψ j
[
lny jt− lny?j
]
(26)
These assumptions allow us to simplify the convergence equation in (22)
d lnyit
dt
=−λit [lnyit− lny?i ] , (27)
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where λ represents the speed of convergence.10 Solving the first order differential equation in (27)
and subtracting the income per worker at some initial date lnyit−T :
lnyit− lnyit−T
T
=−1− e
−λit
T
lnyit−T +
1− e−λit
T
lny?i (28)
This model predicts convergence, due to the fact that growth of real income per worker is a negative
function of income at initial date. Therefore, poor economies grow faster than rich ones, indicating
convergence in economic growth, after controlling for the determinants of the steady state. For this
reason, we obtain the expression that allows us to contrast the existence of conditioned convergence, or
convergence of economies to its own steady states.
Finally, substituting the income per worker in the steady state we can rewrite this equation for econ-
omy i:
lnyit− lnyit−T
T
=−
(
1− e−λit
)
T
lnyit−T +
(
1− e−λit
)
T
1
1−η lnΩ
+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
αK+θ
1−η lns
K
i +
(
1− e−λit
)
T
αP+φ
1−η lns
P
i +
(
1− e−λit
)
T
αH+ γ
1−η lns
H
i
+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
αK+θ
1−η ln(1− τ)+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
αP+αH+φ + γ
1−η lnτ
−
(
1− e−λit
)
T
η
1−η ln(ni+g+δ )+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
θ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lnsKj
+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
φ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lnsPj +
(
1− e−λit
)
T
γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lnsHj
+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
θ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
ln(1− τ)+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
lnτ
−
(
1− e−λit
)
T
θ +φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j ln(n j+g+δ )
+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
θ +φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j lny?j
+
(
1− e−λit
)
T
θ +φ + γ
1−η ρ
n
∑
j=1
1
(1− e−λit )wi j
[
lny jt− lny jt−T
]
(29)
The convergence equation in expression (29) allows contrasting conditioned convergence on income
and its determinants. Here, the growth of income per worker is a negative function of the initial level
10See Appendix 2 for further details.
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of income per worker, after controlling for the determinants of the steady state. More specifically, the
growth rate of income per worker depends positively on physical investment, private and public, and hu-
man capital, and negatively on its own labor growth. Also, the growth on income per worker is a function
of the same variables in neighboring economies because of technological interdependence. We can ob-
serve that the income growth is higher in economies with less initial income, indicating the existence of
convergence, although the growth rate is higher, the larger is the initial income in neighboring economies.
Finally, this is qualified by the last term in (29) indicating that income growth in an economy also depends
on its neighbor’s income growths. In what follows we contrast empirically the effectiveness of this spatial
augmented neoclassical model with public sector in Spanish regions. Then, we will show how the tech-
nological interdependence as well as public and human capital can influence convergence in economic
growth. Additionally, since we have introduced fiscal policy, we can analyze the tax income effect and
the existence of fiscal spillovers in Spanish regions.
3 Econometric specification, data and results
3.1 Econometric specification and methods
The empirical contrast of the convergence equation in (29) is performed on the basis of the following
Spatial Autoregressive Regression (SAR) model:
lnyit− lnyit−1 =β0−β1 lnyit−1+β2 lnsKit +β3 lnsPit +β4 lnsHit +β5 lnτit
−β6 ln(ni+g+δ )+ρ1W lnyit−1+ρ2W lnsKit +ρ3W lnsPit
+ρ4W lnsHit +ρ5W lnτit−ρ6W ln(nit+g+δ )
+ρ7W [lnyit− lnyit−1]+uit
uit = µi+ vit ,
(30)
where (
1−e−λit )
T
1
1−η lnΩ = β0, and βk and ρk are the (kx1) vectors of parameters to be estimated.
The two components error term uit includes a vector of province effects µi and a vector of identically and
independently distributed disturbance terms vit . It is assumed that µi and vit are independent of each other,
and the regressors matrix. The nTxnT spatial weight matrix W defines dependence across n provinces
along the T periods. In our study the spatial interdependence is based on the consideration of a physical
contiguity matrix, in which its elements would be 1, for two bordering provinces and 0 for all others.
Since contiguity does not change, the spatial weight matrix Wn for one period is the same for all time
periods, and the big WnT =W matrix for all observations, N = nT , is computed as W =Wn⊗ IT . The
row-normalization of W implies that ∑Nj wi j = 1. These matrices specify physical proximity as the main
driver for the presence of spillovers.
The Spatial Autoregressive model in (30) can be expressed as:
(IN−ρW )Yit = β0+βk lnXkit+ρkW lnXkit+µi+ vit , (31)
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where ρ represents the autoregressive coefficient associated to income per worker growth, Yit is the inde-
pendent variable, and Xkit denotes the explanatory variables. From this expression, we can observe that
changes of each explanatory variable will have direct and indirect effects, since income per worker growth
in a province can be affected by variations in the explicative variable in this province and its neighbors.
We follow LeSage and Pace (2009) to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the regressors included
in the convergence equation (30). Thereby, the own- and cross-partial derivatives on average for the T
periods correspond to the following expression:
∂ lnYit
∂ lnXkit
= (IN− ρˆW )−1(IN βˆk+W ρˆk), (32)
which provides an NxN matrix for each regressor. The total effect is estimated from these matrices as
the average of the rows sum (or columns). The direct effect is computed as the average of the diagonal
elements, whereas the difference between the total and direct effects reflects the indirect effects, which
can also be computed as the row sum of the off-diagonal elements. The derivative (32) can be further
decomposed into the internal effect: (IN − ρˆW )−1(IN βˆk), and the spillover effect: (IN − ρˆW )−1(W ρˆk).
Additionally, we obtain equivalent results if we consider internal values of the explanatory variables
evaluated in each province, and values in the neighboring provinces or spillover effects separately.
In the estimation of equation (30) we consider spatial panel econometric techniques that allow us to
introduce specific heterogeneities (Baltagi, 2008). We base our estimation on the spatial error component
model, with random effects, which is the most general and appropriate specification to make unconditional
inferences on the population based on a sample (Beenstock and Felsenstein, 2007). We focus on the
spatial error component best two stage least squares estimator (SEC-B2SLS), provided by Baltagi and Liu
(2011). These authors extend Baltagi (1981) error component two-stage least square estimator, following
the method introduced by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and using Lee (2003) optimal instruments for this
spatial autoregressive panel model. Additionally, we check robustness comparing the obtained results
with other different standard methods in the literature of spatial models: Kelejian and Prucha (1998)
2SLS, and the most extended estimator in spatial panel models, the fixed effects spatial panel FE-S2SLS.
3.2 Data
The proposed convergence equation is estimated using individual information on the Spanish provinces
from 1980 to 2007. Data came from two main statistical sources: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
private labour (number of employees) from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional
de Estadística, INE). The series of productive (i.e., non-residential) private capital (K), public capital
(P) and human capital (H) are taken from the database compiled by Mas et al. (2011) at the Instituto
Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas (IVIE) constructed using a perpetual inventory method. The
tax income is included in the database on the public sector (“Las diferencias regionales del sector publico
español”) elaborated also by the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas (IVIE). All variables
are expressed in 2000 constant values.
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Income is expressed in per capita terms, while the capital investment represents the share of income
invested in private, public and human capital; the last corresponds to public expenditure on education.
Furthermore, the size of the public sector is introduced in terms of the fiscal policy, which is analyzed
through tax revenues. Finally, the labor growth rate includes technological growth and depreciation rates
.11 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics corresponding to variables used in the analysis.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Income per worker: y 30,113.149 5,020.943 12,435.481 41,420.183
Private Capital: sK 0.145 0.046 0.039 0.533
Public Capital: sP 0.040 0.017 0.007 0.127
Human Capital: sH 0.004 0.002 <0.001 0.025
Tax Income: τ 0.130 0.067 0.040 0.491
Labor Growth: n+g+δ 0.067 0.036 <0.001 0.418
3.3 Results
We analyze the contribution of public policies on convergence introducing spatial interactions. The pe-
riod of time used is of special interest given that it coincides with an increase in the decentralization of
public functions as Spain joined the European Community. Both events gave rise to substantial growth in
public investment intended to improve public infrastructure, while the whole tax and revenue system was
perfected so as to match European guidelines. Results following spatial panel data analysis techniques are
shown in Table 2. Wald statistics of joint significance show that all the equations estimated are significant.
Looking at the results reported in Table 2 we can see how the popular fixed effects spatial panel
two stage least squares estimator (FE-S2SLS) and the error component best two stage least squares esti-
mator (SEC-B2SLS) by Baltagi and Liu (2011) yield similar results. These results show robustness, in
comparison with those obtained in some other papers, in which the authors estimate convergence equa-
tions following spatial econometric techniques. For instance, Arbia et al. (2008) analyze β−convergence
linked to the Neoclassical Growth Model in a set of NUTS 2 EU regions, concluding that the model im-
plied by the cross-sectional approach differs from panel data models. In our case, the estimation obtained
from spatial panel techniques, FE-S2SL and SEC-B2SLS estimators, are similar than the cross-sectional
estimation by 2SLS estimator.
Focusing on the SEC-B2SLS estimator, we observe convergence in income per worker with an im-
plied speed of convergence of 4%. Although the spillover effects on income level and growth are positive.
Therefore, the income level and the economic growth of neighboring provinces affect positively the eco-
nomic growth, with values of 0.033 and 0.731 respectively, indicating that the income per worker growth
11As is standard in the growth literature, we take g+δ to be equal to 0.05 for all provinces and years (Mankiw et al., 1992).
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Table 2: Spatial estimation results
lnyit − lnyit−1 2SLS FE−2SLS SEC−B2SLS
Constant(c) −0.297(−0.51) −0.437(−0.60) 0.359(0.91)
lnyit−1 −0.042(−5.15)∗∗∗ −0.069(−4.56)∗∗∗ −0.043(−6.67)∗∗∗
lnsKit 0.014(335)∗∗∗ 0.010(1.93)∗ 0.013(3.85)∗∗∗
lnsPit −0.005(−1.71)∗ −0.0005(−0.11) −0.004(−1.74)∗
lnsHit 0.0002(0.11) 0.0005(0.16) −0.0005(−0.26)
lnτit 0.005(1.53) −0.013(−1.21) 0.006(2.23)∗∗
ln(ni+g+δ ) −0.031(−17.29)∗∗∗ −0.032(−15.53)∗∗∗ −0.030(−21.95)∗∗∗
W lnyit−1 0.053(2.58)∗∗∗ 0.087(2.59)∗∗∗ 0.033(2.27)∗∗
W lnsKit −0.015(−2.63)∗∗∗ −0.011(−1.40) −0.015(−3.33)∗∗∗
W lnsPit 0.004(0.88) −0.002(−024) 0.006(1.71)∗
W lnsHit 0.002(−0.39) −0.0001(−0.02) −0.001(−0.32)
W lnτit −0.006(−0.95) 0.015(1.03) −0.002(−0.33)
W ln(ni+g+δ ) 0.034(3.68)∗∗∗ 0.035(3.55)∗∗∗ 0.024(3.72)∗∗∗
W [lnyit − lnyit−1] 1.202(2.95)∗∗∗ 1.254(2.93)∗∗∗ 0.731(2.63)∗∗∗
Associated λ 0.04 0.07 0.04
Wald test 607.78 461.2 989.44
Notes: t-statistic in parenthesis. * Parameter significant at 90%. ** Parameter significant
at 95%. ** Parameter significant at 99%. Observations = 1269. 2SLS =Two Stage Least
Squares Estimator, Kelejian and Prucha (1998). FE-2SLS= Fixed Effects Spatial Two Stage
Least Squares Estimator. SEC-B2SLS = Spatial Error Component Best Two Stage Least
Squares Estimator, Baltagi and Liu (2011).
in other provinces is more intense than the income per worker level, in accordance with other studies
using Spanish provincial data (Baños et al., 2012). This can be explained by the fact that having richer
provinces as neighbors benefit economic activity since this contributes to intensify economic interactions
with those provinces.
In the case of private capital, there is a direct positive effect on growth, but the spillover effect is
negative and slightly higher, by 1.15 percent, because of competition between provinces to attract private
investment. Furthermore, the positive contribution of public capital also exhibits spillovers effects with a
value of 0.006. Again, these results are in line with those obtained in the literature for Spanish regions (see
Mas et al. (1995, 1998), among others). Particularly, Mas et al. (1995) estimate convergence equations
for the 17 Spanish regions for the 1955–1991 period, concluding that public capital had a significant
role in the convergence process, with a coefficient of 0.005. Furthermore, Mas et al. (1998) discuss the
existence of convergence among Spanish regions during 1964− 1993 and the importance of of public
capital endowments in explaining Total Factor Productivity (TFP), with an elasticity of 0.1107. So, in
general, public capital has a positive effect on income growth due to this indirect effect, reflecting that
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economic activity is benefited from the public investment localized in the nearest provinces. Finally,
regarding tax income, we can observe a direct positive effect, indicating that the higher the financial
support for public activities results in internal benefits.
Table 3: Summary estimates of direct and indirect effects
Internal Effect Spillover Effect Total Effect
Income per worker: lnyit−1
Direct −0.05208 0.009777 −0.04231
Indirect −0.10694 0.112625 0.005688
Total Effects −0.15902 0.122402 −0.03662
Private Capital: lnsKit
Direct 0.015292 −0.00454 0.010756
Indirect 0.031397 −0.05224 −0.02085
Total Effects 0.046688 −0.05678 −0.01009
Public Capital: lnsPit
Direct −0.00458 0.001795 −0.00279
Indirect −0.00941 0.020674 0.011265
Total Effects −0.01399 0.022469 0.008477
Human Capital: lnsKit
Direct −0.00056 −0.00029 −0.00085
Indirect −0.00114 −0.00337 −0.00451
Total Effects −0.0017 −0.00366 −0.00536
Tax Income: lnτit
Direct 0.006789 −0.00046 0.006332
Indirect 0.013939 −0.00526 0.008676
Total Effects 0.020728 −0.00572 0.015008
Labor Growth: ln(nit +g+δ )
Direct −0.03641 0.007040 −0.02937
Indirect −0.07476 0.081098 0.006335
Total Effects −0.11118 0.088138 −0.02304
Table 3 shows the disaggregation between direct and indirect effects, according to the different terms
in (32). The results corresponding to the total effects, including their direct and the indirect terms, can be
compared to the coefficients’ estimates in Table 2. We observe that both sets of results are rather similar.
Regarding the initial level of income per worker, the direct effect is negative, while the indirect effect is
positive and lower, indicating that income in the nearest provinces affects positively, although the direct
effect predominates. For this reason, the total effect is negative, allowing us to corroborate the existence
of convergence at a 4% rate.
With regards to the private capital, its direct effect is positive and lower than the indirect effect, which
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is negative. As a result the net total effect is negative with a value of −0.01. In contrast, public capital
affects positively economic growth, with an elasticity of 0.008, because it presents a positive indirect effect
that is four times larger than the negatively valued direct effect. As previously commented, this elasticity
is similar to the one obtained in Mas et al. (1995), in which the authors obtained a positive effect of public
capital on convergence with a coefficient of 0.005. Furthermore, tax income affects positively, with a value
of 0.015, which is the sum of direct, 0.006, and indirect effects, 0.009. In addition, the human capital is
not relevant for the convergence process, according to the coefficients significance in Table 2. If we look
at Table 3, we can see that the total effect of education investment is negative, with both negative direct
and indirect effects. Some authors argue that the human capital, as educational attainment, contributes
to divergence due to the unequal distribution and educational policies in Spanish provinces (Serrano,
1998).12 Finally, it is worth noting that the total effect corresponding to labor growth is negative, with the
direct effect predominating over the indirect positive effect. This would be an indirect corroboration of
the existence of agglomeration economies drawing production factors to locations with larger economic
activity and whose growth is reinforced; which contributes to intensify divergence and constitutes the main
proposition of theories explaining core-periphery patterns (Barbero and Zofío, 2012).Additionally, this
methodology allows us to predict growth income per worker. In Figure 1 we can observe the forecasting
power of the model.
Figures 2 and 3 present these analyses, focusing on the marginal contribution to income per worker
growth, and the sensitivity of the speed of convergence with respect to changes in the explanatory vari-
ables. Figure 2 differentiates between internal and spillover effect. In this case, we can observe a positive
response in public investment and tax income. However, the marginal effects on income decrease when
public policies intensify both public investment and the financial support received by public administra-
tions, due to the trends observed in spillovers and internal effects, respectively. So, as we increase public
investment and tax revenues, economic growth decreases because of reductions in the spillover effects in
public investment and the internal effect on fiscal policies. Furthermore, private, human capital and labor
growth produce negative effects on economic growth. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that while these
negative effects show an increasing rate in the case of private capital due to spillover effect, the growth of
labor increases its influence on income in response to an increasing internal effect.
Analyzing the marginal effects on income growth of both the internal and spillover effects of the ex-
planatory variables, we conclude that, firstly, public capital has a positive impact on economic growth
through spillover effects, although these effects are decreasing while the internal effect increases. Sec-
ondly, the other interesting result is that tax revenues generate a positive and decreasing effect on income
growth due to internal effect, improving the spillover effect.
Figure 3 shows the contribution on the speed of convergence of the explanatory variables. We di-
vide the sample according to the provincial income level, in order to explore the effect of the different
policy instruments on cohesion. The private capital investment contributes to improving the speed of
12Castello and Domenech (2002) obtain similar results introducing the Gini distribution of education in a convergence
equation for 108 countries over five-years intervals from 1960 to 2000.
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convergence below 50 per cent increments in low income economies, and large increases in high income
economies. When we consider the public capital the situation is substantially different. In this case, we
can observe that there is a level of percentage increase for which improvements in investment in low in-
come economies contribute to increase the speed of convergence. Moreover, labor growth shows similar
results. Furthermore, investment in education contributes to accelerate convergence in both low and high
income economies, while tax revenues affects positively to cohesion in low income economies but for
high income ones they intensify disparities.
4 Conclusions
In this article we analyze the convergence in Spanish regions during the period 1980–2007, extending the
neoclassical growth model with public sector and fiscal policies, and incorporating knowledge spillovers
in the production process by taking into account spatial interactions. With this aim in mind, we perform
empirical contrasts on the basis of novel spatial econometric techniques recently proposed in the liter-
ature, and that introduce these spatial spillovers as determinants of convergence. We make use of new
programming routines that allow the implementation of these approaches in MATLAB.
Results show strong evidence of convergence in economic growth and, therefore, a reduction in eco-
nomic disparities. Moreover, the spillover effects on the regions’ income levels and growth are positive.
Consequently, we confirm that the level of economic activity of neighboring provinces affect positively
the development of a given geographical area. This can be explained by the fact that having richer neigh-
bor provinces can benefit a region’s economic activity since this contributes to intensify the commercial
relations with those provinces. In the case of private capital, we identified a direct positive effect on
growth, but characterized by negative spillover effects, because of competition between provinces to at-
tract private investment. Furthermore, the positive contribution of public capital is provided by spillover
effects. So, in general, the public capital has a positive effect on income growth through this indirect
channel, reflecting that economic activity is also benefited from the public investment localized in the
nearest provinces. Finally, regarding tax income, we can observe a direct positive effect, indicating that
public financial support results in internal benefits.
Additionally, this methodology allows us to evaluate the marginal effects of regressors on income
growth and the speed of convergence. Analyzing the marginal effects on income growth of both the
internal and spillover effects associated to the explicative variables, it is worth noting that: Firstly, public
capital has a positive impact on economic growth through spillover effects, although these effects are
decreasing in magnitude, while the internal effect increases. The human capital affects negatively, but
with increasing impact trends on economic growth. Furthermore, the other interesting result is that tax
revenues bring a positive but decreasing effect on income growth due to internal effect, and also improve
the spillover effect. Therefore, we can conclude that public policies oriented to reinforce the economic
growth and regional cohesion should pay attention to public investment and expenditure in education
taking into account the increasing importance of the internal effect, particularly with respect to public
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capital. Moreover, the spillover effects of tax revenues from neighbor provinces is increasing with respect
to internal benefits, reflecting some competition between provinces to obtain resources provided by public
administration.
Regarding convergence, it can be fostered by promoting investment on education given its acceler-
ating effect on the speed of the catching-up process. Moreover, considering public policies oriented to
increase public investment it is worth highlight that there is a growth rate from which improvements in in-
vestment in low income economies contribute to enhance the speed of convergence. Given this result, the
better option is orienting public investment efforts on rich economies. Also, tax revenues affect cohesion
positively in low income economies; on the contrary they intensify disparities in high income economies.
As a result, from these analyses we conclude that fiscal policies do affect economic growth and regional
cohesion in different and even opposing ways, sometimes contributing to it in a direct and indirect way,
and sometimes being detrimental.
These findings have important implications for policy makers that can be qualified for low and high
income regions. In fact, our results also show that it is necessary to take into account the departing
income levels when determining the positive effects of public investment on economic growth and regional
cohesion. While investing in human capital has positive effects across all regions, this is not the case of
investment in public capital and tax revenues, where high income economies tend to benefit most from
the former, and low income countries from the latter. Finally, the spatial nature of the effects should not
be overlooked; for instance, the fiscal policy proxied by tax revenues, contributes to economic growth
through spillover effects, which intensify competition between regions for public resources, and would
allow reducing disparities reallocating the financial support from public administration to the poorest
economies.
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A Taylor approximation of transitional dynamics
The log linearization of equations (5)–(7) is obtained by differentiation w.r.t each capital:
∂ k˙it
∂kit
= sKi (1− τ)
∂yit
∂kit
− (ni+δ )
∂ p˙it
∂ pit
= sPi τ
∂yit
∂ pit
− (ni+δ )
∂ h˙it
∂hit
= sHi τ
∂yit
∂hit
− (ni+δ )
Multiplying and dividing by the income yields:
∂ k˙it
∂kit
=
sKi (1− τ)∂yit∂kit yit
yit
− (ni+δ )
∂ p˙it
∂ pit
=
sPi τ
∂yit
∂ pit
yit
yit
− (ni+δ )
∂ h˙it
∂hit
=
sHi τ
∂yit
∂hit
yit
yit
− (ni+δ )
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Since in the steady state sKi (1− τ)yit , sPi τyit , and sHi τyit are equal to (ni+ g+ δ )kit , (ni+ g+ δ )pit ,
and (ni+g+δ )hit respectively:
∂ k˙it
∂kit
=
(ni+g+δ )kit ∂yit∂kit yit
yit
− (ni+δ )
∂ p˙it
∂ pit
=
(ni+g+δ )pit ∂yit∂ pit yit
yit
− (ni+δ )
∂ h˙it
∂hit
=
(ni+g+δ )hit ∂yit∂hit yit
yit
− (ni+δ )
Now, taking into account that (kit
∂yit
∂kit
)/yit = αK+θ , (pit ∂yit∂ pit )/yit = αP+φ , and (hit
∂yit
∂hit
)/yit = αH+γ ,
one gets:
∂ k˙it
∂kit
= (ni+g+δ )(αK+θ)− (ni+δ )
∂ p˙it
∂ pit
= (ni+g+δ )(αP+φ)− (ni+δ )
∂ h˙it
∂hit
= (ni+g+δ )(αH+ γ)− (ni+δ )
Rearranging, the following expressions are obtained:
∂ k˙it
∂kit
= g− (1−αK−θ)(ni+g+δ )
∂ p˙it
∂ pit
= g− (1−αP−φ)(ni+g+δ )
∂ h˙it
∂hit
= g− (1−αH− γ)(ni+g+δ )
The Taylor approximation around the steady state is obtained following these expressions:
f (lnkit) = f (lnk?i )+ f
′(lnk?i ) [lnkit− lnk?i ]
f (ln pit) = f (ln p?i )+ f
′(ln p?i ) [ln pit− ln p?i ]
f (lnhit) = f (lnh?i )+ f
′(lnh?i ) [lnhit− lnh?i ]
Finally, since f (lnk?i ) = f (ln p
?
i ) = f (lnh
?
i ) = 0, and inserting the former expressions into the latter
for the derivatives we get equations (19)–(21).
d lnkit
dt
= g− (1−αK−θ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnkit− lnk?i ]
d ln pit
dt
= g− (1−αP−φ)(ni+g+δ ) [ln pit− ln p?i ]
d lnhit
dt
= g− (1−αH− γ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnhit− lnh?i ]
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B Convergence speed
Introducing equation (27) into the production function for i = 1, . . . ,n and rewriting the convergence
equation (22):
d lnyit
dt
=(αk+θ) [g− (1−αK−θ)(ni+g+δ )([lnyit− lny?i ]− [lnkit− lnk?i ])]
+(αP+φ) [g− (1−αP−φ)(ni+g+δ )([lnyit− lny?i ]− [ln pit− ln p?i ])]
+(αH+ γ) [g− (1−αH− γ)(ni+g+δ )([lnyit− lny?i ]− [lnhit− lnh?i ])]
+θρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αK−θ)(n j+g+δ )([lnyit− lny?i ]−
[
lnk jt− lnk?j
]
)
]
+φρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αP−φ)(n j+g+δ )([lnyit− lny?i ]−
[
ln p jt− ln p?j
]
)
]
+γρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αH− γ)(n j+g+δ )([lnyit− lny?i ]−
[
lnh jt− lnh?j
]
)
]
Following hypothesis (23)–(25) we obtain the relation:
θρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αK−θ)(n j+g+δ )
[
lnk jt− lnk?j
]]
+φρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αP−φ)(n j+g+δ )
[
ln p jt− ln p?j
]]
+γρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αH− γ)(n j+g+δ )
[
lnh jt− lnh?j
]]

=
= λit

(αk+θ) [g− (1−αK−θ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnkit− lnk?i ]]
+(αP+φ) [g− (1−αP−φ)(ni+g+δ ) [ln pit− ln p?i ]]
+(αH+ γ) [g− (1−αH− γ)(ni+g+δ ) [lnhit− lnh?i ]]
+θρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αK−θ)(n j+g+δ )
[
lnk jt− lnk?j
]]
+φρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αP−φ)(n j+g+δ )
[
ln p jt− ln p?j
]]
+γρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
[
g− (1−αH− γ)(n j+g+δ )
[
lnh jt− lnh?j
]]

with
Λit =
(
θρ∑nj=1wi j
1
Θ +φρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Φ + γρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Γ
)
(n j+g+δ )(
θρ∑nj=1wi j
1
Θ +φρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Φ + γρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Γ
)
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Taking this relationship and with hypothesis (26) we can simplify the convergence equation:
d lnyit
dt
=θρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j(n j+g+δ )[lny jt− lny?j ]+φρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j(n j+g+δ )[lny jt− lny?j ]+
γρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j(n j+g+δ )[lny jt− lny?j ]−Λit [lnyit− lny?i ] =−λit [lnyit− lny?i ]
And then, we obtain finally the speed of convergence as:
λit =
(
θρ∑nj=1wi j
1
Θ +φρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Φ + γρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Γ
)
(n j+g+δ )(
θρ∑nj=1wi j
1
Θ +φρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Φ + γρ∑
n
j=1wi j
1
Γ
)
− (θ +φ + γ)ρ
n
∑
j=1
wi j
1
Ψ
(n j+g+δ )
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Figure 1: Observed and Fitted values
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Figure 2: Marginal contribution to income per capita growth
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Figure 3: Contribution to speed of convergence
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